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I. INTRODUCTION
1

In his target article for this symposium celebrating Michael Risinger,
Bill Thompson expertly covers a lot of ground regarding the communication
of forensic science evidence to laypeople. Among other things, it details and
critiques various presentation formats that could be, and have been, used by
forensic scientists. It also notes various paradigms that have been used to
study how laypeople understand and use that evidence.
In this Article, I focus on alternative forms of explanation that might
improve laypeople’s understanding of forensic comparison evidence.2 As
we consider how to best communicate with factfinders, we need to reflect on
our beliefs about what they need to understand to make a good decision and
what they are likely to understand from various types of presentation. I
conclude that rather than attempt to teach factfinders how to do the
mathematics involved in forensic statistical reasoning, we should tap into
knowledge they already have to develop alternative ways of getting to the
“right” conclusions.
The major sections below do the following: Part II describes some
reasons why we should not torture jurors (or judges) with lessons in statistics.
It refers to some arguments that Thompson made and adds some new ones.
Part III notes some misconceptions that laypeople have about forensic
analysis and some general principles about the psychology of explanation.
Part IV illustrates four possible ways to promote better judgments involving
forensic comparison evidence without ever saying “likelihood ratio” or
“random match probability” or “Bayes’ Theorem”: attribute substitution,
explanation, analogy, and implicit learning tasks.
II. LEAVE THE STATISTICS AND JARGON TO THE EXPERTS (AND STOP
TORTURING THE JURORS)
There are a bunch of reasons why one should not try to explain to a jury
(or judge) the excruciating details of likelihood ratios or random match
probabilities. And there are also a bunch of reasons not to use the jargon of
forensic science.

1
William C. Thompson, How Should Forensic Scientists Present Source Conclusions?,
48 SETON HALL L. REV. 773 (2018).
2
I had wanted to allude to the Far Side cartoon (See Gary Larson, Cartoon of What We
Say to Dogs, THE FAR SIDE COMIC STRIP, https://www.pinterest.com/pin/26585318422380
2510/), depicting a man lecturing his dog about staying out of the garbage while the dog hears
merely a lot of noise interspersed with her name (Ginger). However, Dawn McQuistonSurrett and Michael J. Saks beat me to it with the title of their paper: The Testimony of
Forensic Identification Science: What Expert Witnesses Say and What Factfinders Hear, 33
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 436 (2009).
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A. Our Numbers Are Not Exact So We Should Not Pretend They Are,
Nor Should We Use Non-Statistical Language That Suggests They
Are
Forensic scientists are often concerned with conveying very large (or
very small) exact numbers—typically probabilities or likelihoods—to jurors.
Many studies using vignettes (or videos) with between-subject mock juror
judgments, where different people have different amounts of information,
show that jurors do not use such forensic evidence in a statistically consistent
or appropriate manner.3 At least for now, we should not worry about such
findings. First, as Thompson notes in his target article,4 the science behind
the numbers is not so well-developed that we can be sure the numbers are
even close to accurate. Second, people are likely to overweight seemingly
precise numerical values, at least when they are presented by a human
communicator (rather than by, for example, a computer message).5
Rather than use numbers, forensic scientists often use words like
“individualization” and “match.” As Thompson notes, these are dangerous
terms, and are likely to be overvalued.6 The problem is that laypeople
(sensibly) believe that these terms mean there is exactly one person whose
prints they could be. In a laboratory study that varied fingerprint examiner
terminology, participants who were told that a fingerprint was
“individualized,” were much more likely to think the defendant was the one
who left the prints at the scene than were participants who were told that the
fingerprint was individualized but that “it is possible that the print in question
could have come from someone else.”7
3

See generally Jonathan J. Koehler, On Conveying the Probative Value of DNA
Evidence: Frequencies, Likelihood Ratios, and Error Rates, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 859 (1996);
Jason Schklar & Shari Seidman Diamond, Juror Reactions to DNA Evidence: Errors and
Expectancies, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 159 (1999); Nicholas Scurich & Richard S. John,
Mock Jurors’ Use of Error Rates in DNA Database Trawls, 37 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 424
(2013). But see William C. Thompson & Eryn J. Newman, Lay Understanding of Forensic
Statistics: Evaluation of Random Match Probabilities, Likelihood Ratios, and Verbal
Equivalents, 39 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 332 (2015) (presenting data showing that mock jurors’
probabilistic judgments sometimes approximate Bayesian norms).
4
Thompson, supra note 1, at 778–81.
5
See Y. Charles Zhang & Norbert Schwarz, The Power of Precise Numbers: A
Conversational Logic Analysis, 49 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 944 (2013).
6
Thompson, supra note 1, at 797.
7
Gregory Mitchell & Brandon Garrett, The Impact of Proficiency Testing on the Weight
Given to Fingerprint Evidence (Nov. 1, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the
Seton Hall Law Review). See also Jonathan J. Koehler, When are People Persuaded by DNA
Match Statistics?, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 493 (2001) (showing that presenting information
using frequencies rather than probabilities makes it easier for people to imagine that the print
came from someone other than the suspect). The recognition that someone else could be the
source of fingerprints leads some people to fall prey to the “Defense Attorney’s Fallacy”—
the belief that if multiple people could be the source, then the evidence is worthless. See
William C. Thompson & Edward L. Schumann, Interpretation of Statistical Evidence in
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Using legal terms that have a different meaning from their common
non-legal meaning can create problems. For example, mock jurors’ prior
knowledge of crimes (e.g., believing, falsely, that to be guilty of burglary a
person must be armed and must take property) will influence how they label
a crime vignette, even when judges provide instructions with the full legal
definition. Telling mock jurors to disregard their prior knowledge did not
help much; however, instructions that reviewed their false beliefs and tried
to replace them with true information did improve decisions.8
B. The Possibility of Mistake
Worrying about communicating precise small numbers indicating a
“match” is unnecessary due to the always-greater probability of an error
somewhere in the obtaining, handling, or evaluation of the sample. Although
study participants do not always integrate error information well, when
participants learned about the chances of a coincidental match and the
chances of two types of mistakes—lab error and planted evidence—they did
use Bayesian updating in assessing the source probability for DNA evidence
(although not for shoeprint evidence).9 Participants have also used
knowledge of results of an examiner’s proficiency testing to adjust the
weight given to fingerprint evidence.10
C. Likelihood Ratios and Random Match Probabilities Are Terrible
Ways to Present Information to Actual Human Beings
Likelihood ratios, random match probabilities, and some other
proposed ways of conveying statistical information to factfinders rely on
computing the probability of obtaining the particular evidence given a
particular hypothesis. It is futile to try to explain anything that involves
p(e|h)—the probability of evidence given a hypothesis—to anyone in an
hour, or in a day, or even in a semester of an undergraduate college course
in Research Methods and Statistics.
Surveys of psychology academics who rely on p-values for decisions
about significance reveal that a large percentage (90% of those not teaching
methods) makes common errors when trying to explain what a p-value
Criminal Trials: The Prosecutors’ Fallacy and the Defense Attorney’s Fallacy, 11 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 167 (1987).
8
See Vicki L. Smith, When Prior Knowledge and Law Collide: Helping Jurors Use the
Law, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 507 (1993); Vicki L. Smith, Prototypes in the Courtroom: Lay
Representations of Legal Concepts, 61 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 857 (1991).
9
See Thompson & Newman, supra note 3.
10
See Mitchell & Garrett, supra note 7. The experience of the examiner was also shown
to matter in Jonathan J. Koehler, N. J. Schweitzer, Michael J. Saks & Dawn McQuiston,
Science, Technology, or Examiner Experience: What Influences Jurors’ Judgments about
Forensic Science Testimony?, 22 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 401 (2016).
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represents. They are likely to say that p is the probability that given the data,
the null hypothesis (of no difference between means), is true. That is (in a
world of two exclusive/exhaustive hypotheses), they believe that 1-p
represents the likelihood that their own hypothesis is true given the data—a
form of p(h|e). But . . . alas, no. A p-value represents the probability of
getting the data (or, rather, data that is as extreme or more extreme than the
data obtained) given that the null hypothesis is true—a form of p(e|h). If
academic researchers who have worked with p-values for years, and are
invested in understanding them, cannot get it right, there is little hope for
factfinders.11
The problem is, of course, that p(e|h) is not what people want to know.
The statistic gets (unintentionally) reinterpreted, typically by way of the
Prosecutor’s Fallacy12 or the Source Probability Error13 into something that
factfinders believe is useful.
D. (Almost) All Evidence is Statistical Anyway
The debate about whether jurors should have to deal with probabilities/
statistics is not one worth having. Jurors already do. The reliability of every
piece of evidence and every witness is in play—and we can think of that as
invoking jurors’ statistical sensibilities. Is this witness likely to be lying
under these circumstances? How likely? What are the chances that installing
a safety device would have prevented the accident? We accept that jurors
must deal with this kind of uncertainty.14 We also ask them to make
judgments that are “more likely than not”—which certainly sound like we
expect them to assess probabilities.
Why do we think forensics is special? Perhaps we think it is special
because it is “scientific” and jurors typically do not understand how it works.
Perhaps we think it is special because it involves some numerical concepts
and we know that many people are innumerate or afraid of math.
But maybe instead of worrying so much about how to present exact
statistics, we should think more about what people already know and how to
leverage it so that they can make better judgments when dealing with
11

The data are from Heiko Haller & Stefan Krauss, Misinterpretations of Significance:
A Problem Students Share with their Teachers, 7 METHODS PSYCHOL. RES. 1 (2002). For a
broader discussion and overview of the relevant data, see Blakeley B. McShane & David Gal,
Statistical Significance and the Dichotomization of Evidence, 112 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 885
(2017). McShane and Gal misleadingly describe the Haller and Krauss study as if it had been
done by Gerd Gigerenzer in Mindless Statistics, 33 J. SOCIO-ECONOMICS 587 (2004). Id.
12
See Thompson & Schumann, supra note 7.
13
See Jonathan J. Koehler, Error and Exaggeration in the Presentation of DNA
Evidence, 34 JURIMETRICS J. 21 (1993).
14
“[M]ost knowledge, and almost all legal evidence, is probabilistic.” DePass v. United
States, 721 F.2d 203, 207 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J., dissenting).
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forensic statistics.
III. MISCONCEPTIONS AND EXPLANATION
To think about how forensic science might best be communicated to
factfinders, we should consider what psychological science has discovered
about explaining and teaching complex concepts generally. We should also
consider what preconceptions and misconceptions factfinders might have at
the start. And, of course, we should recognize that we (e.g., anyone who can
read and understand Thompson’s target article) are unlikely to be able to
gauge what jurors will understand; our intuitions are blown, we suffer from
the “curse of knowledge.” The “curse of knowledge” refers to a
psychological experimental finding that people are likely to misattribute
their estimates of the ease of a task (e.g., understanding forensic statistics) to
features of the task itself rather than appropriately to their own prior
knowledge or experience.15 To experts, too much seems too easy.
A. Misconceptions Needing Repair
People are likely to have several misconceptions about the forensic
disciplines. For example, I suspect that people have (at least) four important
misconceptions about fingerprints. First, most laypeople believe that every
person has unique fingerprints. In two samples, involving more than 1,200
Amazon Turk workers, about 95% of US respondents indicated belief that
fingerprints are unique.16 It might be useful to tell factfinders that forensic
scientists do not actually know whether people have unique-as-snowflakes
fingerprints.
A second misconception is that if there is a latent print, it can be used
to identify a source. People do not seem to realize that there are often partial
and degraded prints that do not provide enough information to be useful and
that even prints that pass a minimum threshold still vary in the amount of
information they contain.
The third and most important misconception is not about betweenperson variability of prints but rather is about within-person variability of
prints. I expect that most people believe that every time a source leaves a
fingerprint, it will look remarkably “the same”. Although I do not have
reliable data, this guess comes not only from the ease with which fingerprint
hits occur on television (often with a lovely computer lightshow accentuating
15

See Colleen M. Kelley & Larry L. Jacoby, Adult Egocentrism: Subjective Experience
Versus Analytic Bases for Judgment, 35 J. MEMORY & LANGUAGE 157 (1996).
16
Brandon Garrett & Gregory Mitchell, How Jurors Evaluate Fingerprint Evidence: The
Relative Importance of Match Language, Method Information, and Error Acknowledgment,
10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 484 (2013). In another study sample, 84.3% of participants
indicated that they believed fingerprints were unique. Mitchell & Garrett, supra note 7.
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the “match”) but also from years of watching the faces of students when I
say to them: “Every time you lay down a fingerprint it is different in some
way from every other one you have ever produced.” This fact startles the
students and I do give them more explanation (see Part IV, Section B,
below).
A fourth misconception—or, perhaps, something most people do not
think of unless reminded—is that there are many different potential types of
errors in the process—including in procurement, laboratory testing, or
reporting of results.
If I am correct, these are specific misconceptions that need to be
repaired early during the explanation of fingerprint evidence. But the
misconceptions (or true knowledge) that factfinders bring to the courtroom
are likely to vary from one forensic discipline to another. For example,
Thompson and Newman17 show that participants responded differently to the
same probability information when framed as DNA evidence versus
shoeprint evidence. As mentioned above, people cannot help but bring their
own pre-existing knowledge to reasoning tasks; it is likely that their
experience with shoes as opposed to DNA made them less responsive to the
expert’s shoeprint testimony.
B. Explanation in General
Plenty of psychology research (so much that I cannot think of a
prototypical cite offhand) has shown that people will remember, understand,
and be more likely to use information when they are given an explanation
for it. It is one thing to tell people that something is the case; it is another to
give an explanation that shows why or how it became the case. As a simple
example, you could try to teach someone to remember the numbers in this
sequence: 1, 8, 27, 64, 125. Memorizing, reciting, or quickly coming up with
the sixth number of the sequence is difficult until one is told (or induces) that
the sequence is of integers cubed. The explanation (here a rule) makes it
possible to regenerate the sequence and connect it to information that is
already known.
People are better at solving problems when they understand the
rationale (i.e., have an explanation) for the relationship between elements of
the problem.18 Explanations also benefit from having multiple examples
17

Thompson & Newman, supra note 3. Shoeprint testimony was shown to have had
little effect on mock jurors’ decisions in Kristy A. Martire, Richard I. Kemp, Ian Watkins,
Malindi A. Sayle & Ben R. Newell, The Expression and Interpretation of Uncertain Forensic
Science Evidence: Verbal Equivalence, Evidence Strength, and the Weak Evidence Effect, 37
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 197 (2013).
18
For example, in the now-famous Wason Selection Task, first described in P.C. Wason,
Reasoning About a Rule, Q.J. EXP. PSYCHOL. 273 (1968), participants are told about a deck of
cards, each with a letter on one side and a number on the other. They are shown four cards:
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rather than relying on merely one example. From those many examples,
people can abstract underlying principles or rules that would apply in other
appropriately similar situations.19
IV.

APPLICATIONS TO UNDERSTANDING LIKELIHOOD RATIOS

Below I describe four techniques that could be useful in helping
factfinders grasp statistical concepts important to understanding comparison
evidence. Note that I do not believe that the exact statistics necessarily need
to be reported after this knowledge (or intuition) is developed. Rather, each
of these techniques might give factfinders a sense of how to use forensic
evidence, presented in whatever form (words or numbers), to appropriately
adjust their beliefs.
A. Attribute Substitution
Beginning in the 1960’s and 1970’s, psychological science had to admit
that human decision-making was not “rational,” in that it does not follow the
laws of logic or probability. In the subsequent tidal wave of hundreds of
studies, human decision makers were shown to make errors or reveal biases
in judgment.20 An important insight, however, was that the errors or biases
were not random; rather, they were systematic, thus revealing some
principles underlying human reasoning processes.
A good explanation for why and how people give systematic but
irrational answers to statistical questions is this: if someone thinks a question
is too hard, or does not know the answer, or does not have time or mental
resources to answer it, he or she will find an easier related question and
answer that. So, for example, when people are asked whether there are more
deaths from airplane or automobile accidents per year, and answer the
former, it is because they do not know the true answer and so substitute the
question: “Which do I hear more about?”21 Here, they are substituting
E K 4 7. They are told there is a rule for the cards: if there is a vowel on one side then there
is an even number on the other. Then they are asked which cards must be turned over to
ensure that the rule is followed. In this standard variant of the task, most participants err by
choosing only the E to turn over, and not acknowledging that the 4 must be turned over as
well. An analysis of the many variants of the tasks used suggests that understanding the
rationale for the rule is key to getting the problem correct. Patricia W. Cheng & J. Holyoak,
Pragmatic Reasoning Schemas, 17 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 391 (1985).
19
With regard to using multiple examples in analogical reasoning, see Mary L. Gick &
Keith J. Holyoak, Schema Induction and Analogical Transfer, 15 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 1
(1980).
20
For a brief history and overview of this research, see Barbara A. Spellman & Simone
Schnall, Embodied Rationality, 35 QUEEN’S L.J. 117 (2009). For a compendium of the early
research, see Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (Daniel Kahneman, Paul
Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 1982).
21
The true answer, of course, is that there are more automobile-related deaths per year.
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familiarity for information (using the “availability heuristic”).
But, attribute substitution works to give the correct answer much of the
time. For example, when asked “which has more earthquakes, California or
New York?” substituting “which do I hear more about?” gives the correct
answer. Accordingly, maybe there is something that can be used to replace
forensic statistics that would give the right answer most of the time.
Although he does not use these terms, or use it for this purpose, Michael
Risinger presents an interesting idea about attribute substitution in his article
called “Leveraging Surprise.”22 His article suggests that surprise could be
used as a way of measuring how much people believe alleged facts. For
example, the more you are surprised to learn that a “fact” is false, the more
you must have previously believed it. Risinger wants to apply the surprise
test to standards of proof. For example, “I’d be extremely EXTREMELY
surprised to learn that the defendant was not the perpetrator” might be a good
expression of belief beyond a reasonable doubt. Ginther and Cheng23 report
a quick first experiment in which participants read a vignette about a crime
and then estimate the probability of guilt (or innocence) and how surprised
they would be to find out that the suspect was innocent (or guilty). The data
show a high correlation between people’s estimations of probability and
surprise.
The relevance to forensic evidence is this: if people reveal a good
correlation when expressing surprise and probability, then perhaps surprise
would be a good way for forensic scientists to communicate probability.
That is, rather than giving a statistic, or even an expression of probability,24
an expression of surprise by a forensic scientist (“I would be extremely
EXTREMELY surprised to learn that it was not the suspect’s fingerprint”)
might be a good way to present the equivalent of statistical evidence. And,
if surprise does not work, perhaps there is some other attribute that would
make a good substitution for probabilities.

Aric Jenkins, Which is Safer: Airplanes or Cars?, FORTUNE (July 20, 2017), http://fortune.co
m/2017/07/20/are-airplanes-safer-than-cars/ (displaying recent statistics about auto-related
fatalities for Americans).
22
D. Michael Risinger, Leveraging Surprise: What Standards of Proof Imply That We
Want from Jurors, and What We Should Say to Them to Get It, 48 SETON HALL L. REV.
(forthcoming 2018).
23
Matthew Ginther & Edward K. Cheng, Surprise vs. Probability as a Metric for Proof,
48 SETON HALL L. REV. (forthcoming 2018).
24
Much research shows that people vary greatly in their interpretation of words like:
probably, likely, etc. See David V. Budescu & Thomas S. Wallsten, Processing Linguistic
Probabilities: General Principles and Empirical Evidence, 32 PSYCHOL. LEARNING &
MOTIVATION 275 (1995).
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B. Explicit Explanation of Variability
Attribute substitution relies on people’s unconscious strategy to answer
questions using a method they already know. Good explanations that draw
on people’s pre-existing knowledge of category variability might also help
them understand forensic conclusions.
1. The Importance of Variability
It turns out that factfinders are likely to already know about the
importance of variability within a category for making inferences about that
category. In a classic study, participants were told to imagine that they were
explorers who had discovered a new island in the Southeastern Pacific
Ocean. They encounter a member of the native population who has brown
skin and is obese, a new type of bird that is blue in color and builds its nest
in a eucalyptus tree, and a new element that conducts electricity and burns
with a green flame. When asked what percentage of the members of each
category (human/bird/element) they thought would share the sample
property, the answers ranged from very few (obesity) to nearly all (conduct
electricity, burn with green flame). Why? Because the participants
understood the underlying variability in those properties.25 Basic knowledge
about category variability is useful but it depends on kinds of background
knowledge of the category that people are not likely to have about
fingerprints.
2. Form of Explanation for Fingerprints
When I talk about variability in fingerprints to my class, I say
something like the following. It is meant to evoke experiences and preexisting knowledge, describe the underlying “how” of fingerprint creation
and use, and impart (I hope) an understanding of why there is not a one-andonly perfect match.
How many of you have ever had your fingerprints taken?26 If it
was a while back, like when I first had mine done, there was a guy
grasping my finger making sure that I rolled it evenly in the ink,
and then that I used a constant pressure as I rolled my finger on
the print paper.27 These days, of course, you place your fingers
25
Richard E. Nisbett, David H. Krantz, Christopher Jepson & Ziva Kunda, The Use of
Statistical Heuristics in Everyday Inductive Reasoning, 90 PSYCHOL. REV. 339 (1983). The
research is also described in JOHN H. HOLLAND, KEITH J. HOLYOAK, RICHARD E. NISBETT &
PAUL R. THAGARD, INDUCTION: PROCESSES OF INFERENCE, LEARNING, AND DISCOVERY (1986).
26
Currently, among the law students at the University of Virginia, it is nearly everyone.
In the olden days, I used to joke that they did not have to admit to having had their fingerprints
taken and some students seemed relieved.
27
Acting this out with body contortions is appreciated by the audience.

SPELLMAN (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

4/28/2018 1:05 PM

COMMUNICATING FORENSIC EVIDENCE

837

spread out, but not too much, on a scanner, and it tells you when
you have good placement for the scan. Okay, fine. But now let’s
consider your fingerprint as picked up by the cops—from a glass
or a doorknob or a gun—which has been smudged by other later
prints, or is on an uneven surface, or you touched or grabbed
briefly while twisting as you ran. That print, which ends up in the
lab after the examiner “picks it up” (in some way that may also
change the print), does not, cannot, look exactly the same as your
pristine carefully placed original print. In fact, even if you were
to go back and try your best to create the exact same original print,
you could get very close but it would not be exact. So, your
fingerprints vary from one time to the next—sometimes a little
and sometimes a lot.
Another thing about fingerprints is that although you may often
hear that “everyone’s fingerprints are different,” we do not know
that for a fact. We certainly do not have the fingerprints of
everyone in the world on file to compare. Plus, sometimes we
only have partial prints. And we certainly cannot rule out that
some parts of someone’s fingerprint might be identical to some
parts of someone else’s fingerprint.
But even if we could say that everyone’s prints are different, we
might still be in trouble because we do not know whether they are
different enough to distinguish them. Because if your fingerprints
differ every time and place you leave them, and other people’s
fingerprints differ every time they leave them, how do we know
that even if your actual fingers are different, that the prints you
end up leaving might not look close to identical? And that’s the
problem—there is a fingerprint there on the gun—and it looks like
it could be from my finger or from yours.28
Perhaps something like this could trigger better reasoning about the
comparison disciplines (e.g., both the ones in which people are less
experienced like fingerprints or ballistics, and more experienced like
shoeprints or handwriting). Then each discipline could supplement training
with domain-specific information.

28
For a description of between versus within variability, see WILLIAM THOMPSON, JOHN
BLACK, ANIL JAIN & JOSEPH KADANE, AAAS, FORENSIC SCIENCE ASSESSMENTS: A QUALITY
AND GAP ANALYSIS—LATENT FINGERPRINT EXAMINATION 17–27 (Sept. 15, 2017), https://
mcmprodaaas.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/reports/Latent%20Fingerprint%20Report%20
FINAL%209_14.pdf?i9xGS_EyMHnIPLG6INIUyZb66L5cLdlb.
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1. Analogy: Explanation Plus Substitution
Another way to tap into using peoples’ pre-existing knowledge of
variability to bolster their understanding of likelihood ratios in forensic
evidence is to use analogy. Using analogy has characteristics of both
explanation and attribute substitution. To use analogy to communicate to
another person, we need to find a domain that is analogous to forensic
science statistics (the “target” domain) in ways we care about—e.g., has
likelihoods, base rates, variability, and uncertainty—but that the learner has
prior experience with, and, preferably, might even have some pre-existing
expertise (the “source” domain).29 Something like face recognition30 might
work.
Step one: Describe some basic important features of the target
domain—forensic comparison processes—that might be unknown to the
listener. (For fingerprints, see example description in Part IV, Section B,
above.)
Step two: Remind the learner of important (relevant) aspects of the
source domain. Something like: “Now comparing fingerprints seems very
complicated, but it is quite similar to something you do every day, something
you are an expert at, but do not even think about much—and that is
recognizing faces. You know what you look like, but you are probably aware
that when you look in the mirror from one day (or one hour) to the next, you
do not look exactly the same. There are bad hair days, bags-under-eyes days,
what’s-wrong-with-my-skin days, and all sorts of intermediate variations.
Yet, you do not have any trouble recognizing yourself in the mirror. Nor do
you have trouble recognizing your close friends, or family, or people you see
daily even though, in fact, they look different every day.”
Step three: Draw out the important similarities for understanding the
target domain. “But now consider someone you do not know well or have
not seen in a while who you run into at a party or, worse yet, a college
reunion. You remember what Nikki looked like 30 years ago, but is that
person Nikki or Jane? Would someone who looked like Nikki 30 years ago
look like this person in front of you now? Or would she look entirely
different? This is one side of the problem of variability—she could look
29

Mary L. Gick & Keith J. Holyoak, Analogical Problem Solving, 12 COGNITIVE
PSYCHOL. 306 (1980); Laura R. Novick, Analogical Transfer, Problem Similarity, and
Expertise, 14 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: LEARNING, MEMORY & COGNITION 510 (1988). For
a description of these and related analogy studies as relevant to judicial decision-making, see
Barbara A. Spellman, Judges, Expertise, and Analogy, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDICIAL
DECISION-MAKING 149 (David E. Klein & Gregory Mitchell eds., 2010) and Barbara A.
Spellman and Frederick Schauer, Analogy, Expertise, and Experience, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 249
(2017).
30
Of course, face recognition could be a tricky example to use because it might be
relevant to the case at hand. Perhaps snowflakes?
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many different ways now—some easy to recognize, some not. Then there is
the other side of the problem—could it be someone else who looks like this
person in front of you now? Probably yes, if Nikki did not have a lot of
distinctive characteristics; but probably no if she had one blue eye, one
brown eye, and was six foot ten.”
This exposition provides the building blocks for understanding
likelihood ratios without ever saying “likelihood ratio.” And it is easy to add
information about how the number of people at the reunion (i.e., the size of
the relevant comparison population) would affect one’s belief about how
likely it could be someone other than Nikki.
2. Implicit Learning Tasks: Experiencing Variability
This last suggestion for helping people understand forensic statistics is
the most speculative. It involves a learn-by-doing task that should not need
verbal explanation of forensics at the outset.
In the 1980’s, psychologists ran many different experimental tasks to
try to understand how people go from seeing instances of categories (e.g.,
lots of birds, lots of hypothetical Martians) to inducing mental
representations of the average member and the variability within the
categories.31 One set of studies asked participants to imagine two artists:
Smith and Wilson. They each designed abstract art that consisted of black
and white squares (on a 10x10 grid). The participants’ task was to
distinguish the work of the two artists. The “artwork” was created by: (a)
creating one basic non-viewed 10x10 grid of black/white squares for each
artist; these represented each artist’s prototypical work; then (b) distorting
each prototype by changing some percentage of squares from black to white
and vice versa; these represent the work the artist produces for viewing.32 In
some variants of the studies, one artist’s work was all fairly similar (i.e., few
squares were changed) whereas the other artist’s work varied a lot (i.e., many
squares were changed). After seeing a few examples of the art, choosing
which artist they thought it belonged to, and getting feedback on their
decision accuracy, participants then saw many more examples and had to
guess which artist they thought produced it, this time without feedback.33
How is this study relevant here? When participants had to categorize
the paintings, they acted as if they were using likelihood ratios based on the
number of color switches from the prototype. That is, many of the paintings
31
For a review, see Douglas L. Medin, Concepts and Categories, 44 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST
1469 (1989).
32
Lisbeth S. Fried & Keith J. Holyoak, Induction of Category Distributions: A
Framework for Classification Learning, 10 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: LEARNING, MEMORY
& COGNITION 234, 241–43 (1984).
33
Id. at 247–48.
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could have been made by either artist, but the participants categorized each
one based on the likelihood of it being from a particular artist given their
knowledge of the variability in the two artists’ paintings. Recall that the
participants had never seen the artists’ prototypes; rather, the variability is
induced from the training examples.34
One potential strength of this procedure is that it is more like learning
about relative frequencies than about probabilities. In many judgment tasks,
people are better at evaluating information when it is presented as
frequencies rather than probabilities.35
This study demonstrates implicit learning of category distributions. In
most laboratory tasks like this one (i.e., category induction from abstract
highly variable examples), participants cannot explain the criteria they are
using in making their decisions. I do not know whether explaining to them
that what they have learned to do is very similar statistically to what forensic
analysts do would help them to understand the statistics or the process. But
it might.
V. SUMMING UP
In this Article, I suggest two major things. First, I jump on the
bandwagon of doubts about some of the ways forensic comparison evidence
is presented to factfinders and I add some psychological backing to some of
those doubts. Second, I propose that there are several ways, coming from a
variety of areas within cognitive psychology, to teach factfinders about
variability, to relate it to things they already know, and to use that as
scaffolding to increase understanding of, and competence in using, forensic
statistical evidence.

34

Id.
The usefulness of frequencies is shown often in the work of Gerd Gigerenzer. For
application to DNA match statistics, see Koehler, supra note 7.
35

